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DISCLAIMER
The design and technical data contained in this thesis are the result of actual laboratory, flight
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United States Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, or the Naval Air Warfare Center. The
recommendations made by the author should not be construed as being attributable to any of the
aforementioned authorities for any purpose other than the fulfillment of thesis requirements.
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ABSTRACT
Controlled-flight-into-terrain incidents have been a leading cause of aircraft related fatalities
for a number of years. The development of warning systems to prevent this type of mishap has
been constant since the early 1970’s. A family Ground Proximity Warning Systems and,
recently, Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems have been mandated for use in commercial
aircraft in the United States.
Such systems have also been adapted for use in high performance military aircraft, although
they tend to be very different from the commercially required variants due to their unique
operating environment and aircraft performance requirements.
In this paper, one such system is described in detail, and a set of unique test techniques
required to test systems for high performance aircraft is explored. A number of recommendations
for testing terrain warning systems intended for use in high performance aircraft are also
developed.
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1. BACKGROUND
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT GPWS SYSTEMS
In the 1970’s a number of studies were conducted to examine what could be done about one of
the leading causes of fatal aircraft accidents – the so-called Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).
A CFIT event is defined as an instance where an airplane, under the flight crew’s control, is
inadvertently flown into terrain, obstructions or water without either sufficient or timely
flightcrew awareness to have prevented the event [1]. As a result of these studies, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) mandated in 1974 that large commercial aircraft be equipped
with a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) compliant with Technical Standard Order
TSO-C92c. In 1978 the FAA extended the GPWS requirement to Part 135 certificate holders
operating turbojet powered airplanes with 10 or more passenger seats [2]. This ruling did not
affect turbo-propeller powered (turboprop) aircraft because it was believed that the performance
characteristics of turboprop airplanes made them less susceptible to CFIT accidents.
However, later studies, including accident investigations by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), analyzed CFIT accidents involving turboprop airplanes and concluded that some
mishaps could have been avoided if GPWS equipment had been used. As a result, the FAA
amended the ruling in 1992 to require that all turbine powered aircraft with greater than 10
passenger seats be equipped with GPWS systems [2].
Since the original GPWS requirements were mandated, advances in terrain mapping capability
permitted the development of a new family of GPWS system that provides greater situational
awareness for flight crews. These systems, known as Enhanced GPWS (EGPWS), have evolved
into a type of system more broadly known as Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS).
After the crash of an American Airlines 757 equipped with GPWS near Cali, Columbia, the
NTSB recommended that the FAA study EGPWS systems and require their installation if they
1

were found to be effective. Subsequent studies by the Department of Transportation into CFIT
accidents between 1985 and 1995 concluded that EGPWS or TAWS systems could have
prevented 95-100 percent of them [3]. As a result, in 1998 the FAA mandated that TAWS
systems be installed in all commercial aircraft (with some limited exceptions) configured with
more than six passenger seats [2].

MILITARY GPWS SYSTEMS
Both tactical and transport class military aircraft have suffered high rates of CFIT accidents as
well. The 1996 death of commerce Secretary Ron Brown and 34 others in Croatia in an Air Force
C-9 highlighted the need for such systems in military transport aircraft. These aircraft, while not
covered under the FAA GPWS or TAWS mandates, can clearly benefit from the same types of
systems in use on commercial aircraft. Indeed, most types of large military transport aircraft
could use the same systems installed in commercial aircraft, without requiring extensive
modifications to either hardware or the protection algorithms due to their similar maneuvering
limitations.
As an example applying to tactical military aircraft, CFIT was the probable cause of over 30%
of all F/A-18 losses during the first ten years of the aircraft’s existence, [4] and is to date the
leading single cause of the loss of aircraft in that community. The single -seat layout, frequent
task saturation experienced by aircrew, and dynamic flight profiles combine to make an
extremely strong case for inclusion of terrain avoidance systems in such aircraft. The frequent
nap-of-the-Earth profiles flown by many rotary wing platforms make them prime candidates for
such systems as well.
However, the operating environment and mission of high-performance tactical aircraft provide
unique challenges for designers of GPWS systems. Many tactical aircraft use computer systems
and displays that are integrated in such a manner as to make it difficult to add external functions
2

to the overall avionics systems without extensive integration efforts. In addition, the flight
envelopes of tactical aircraft are sufficiently different from transport class aircraft as to make the
warning algorithms substantially different.
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2. GPWS/TAWS SYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM
Federally mandated GPWS systems for commercial aircraft initially were required to alert the
aircrew to potential CFIT situations according to the modes [5] shown in Table 2-1. This type of
system uses inputs from aircraft sensors for determining altitude, altitude rate of change and other
aircraft conditions such as gear or flaps positions, and provides a warning of potential contact
with the ground, taking into account crew recognition and reaction time. Aircraft sensor inputs to
the system can include a radio altimeter, air data computer or barometric altimeter, and deviation
from ILS glideslope and localizer. The system outputs include visual and aural alerts and
warnings when it detects by calculated position rate-of-change that the aircraft is closing with
terrain. This type of system, though very useful, provides limited CFIT protection because it is
unable to account for rapidly changing terrain under the aircraft or obstructions in the flight path.
In addition, when in landing configuration, (gear and flaps deployed) warnings are inhibited for
all but excessive rates of descent, limiting protection during approaches.

Table 2-1
GPWS Protection Modes
Protection
Mode
1
2
3
4
5
6

Excessive Rates of Descent
Excessive Closure Rate to Terrain
Negative Climb Rate or Altitude Loss After Takeoff
Flight Into Terrain When Not in Landing Configuration
Excessive Downward Deviation From an ILS Glidescope
500 ft Callout on Non-Precision Approach
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TAWS
Current regulations require systems compliant with TSO-C151a be installed in most
commercial aircraft [2]. These systems offer greater protection from CFIT than GPWS because
of their Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA) capability and Premature Descent Alert
(PDA) functionality. TAWS systems also incorporate improved situational awareness displays
and provide the basic GPWS functionality contained in earlier systems. These systems are
broken into two types, Class A and Class B systems, mandated depending on aircraft operating
criteria as shown in Table 2-2 [6].
TAWS systems utilize terrain, airport and obstacle databases, employing the global standard
WGS-84 spheroid for latitude/longitude reference to provide flight crews with an improved
predictive terrain hazard warning function. The predictive function is achieved by feeding the
aircraft's known position (as determined by a flight management system or by GPS) to a terrain
database, enabling the computer to predict terrain ahead and to the side of the aircraft's flight
path. By referencing terrain and airport databases, TAWS can warn of descent below safe vertical
profiles when the aircraft is in a landing configuration and there is no instrument landing system
glidescope signal present.
Class A systems also incorporate a color display allowing rapid identification of terrain
hazards together with a graphical display of the surrounding terrain. The aircraft position is
shown on the display either by GPS alone or through the flight management system. Specific
TAWS functionality is described in the following sections.
Table 2-2
TAWS Class A and B Summary of Requirements
TAWS
Class

Operating
Rule

PAX
Seats

FLTA

A
A
B
B

121
135
135
91

All
>9
6-9
6+

YES
YES
YES
YES

PDA

GPWS
Modes
(DO-161A)

FMS/RNAV
or
GPS

Mandatory
Terrain
Display

Terrain/
Field
Database

YES
YES
YES
YES

1-6
1-6
1,3,6
1,3,6

Either
GPS
GPS
GPS

YES
YES
NO
NO

YES
YES
YES
YES
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TAWS Minimum Requirements
Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance
The TAWS Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA) warning capability “looks” ahead of
and to the side of the aircraft’s predicted flight path and issues a warning if terrain or obstacles
penetrate the search volume, where the defined search volume varies as a function of flight phase
and aircraft maneuvers. The flight phase must be determined by the TAWS computer using
available inputs in order to ensure the proper mode is enabled where required. The following
definitions are generally recognized, though differences are allowed as long as they are
compatible with terminal procedures (TERPS) and standard instrument approach procedures [6]:
a) Enroute Phase: The aircraft is more than 15 nmi from the nearest airport or the
conditions for Terminal, Approach, and Departure Phases are not met.

b) Terminal Phase: The aircraft is 15 nmi or less from the nearest airport, the range to the
nearest runway threshold is decreasing and the airplane is at or below a straight line
drawn between the two points specified in Table 2-3 relative to the nearest runway.
c) Approach Phase: Distance to nearest runway threshold is less than 5 nmi, height above
the runway threshold is less than 1,900 ft, and distance to threshold is decreasing.

Table 2-3
Height Above Versus Distance To Runway
Distance to Runway
15 nmi
5 nmi

Height Above Runway
3,500 ft
1,900 ft
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d) Departure Phase: The aircraft is defined to be in the departure phase from the point when
it transitions to flight after leaving the runway, until it achieves an altitude of 1,500 ft
AGL. The system must use some combination of sensor parameters to determine when
the aircraft is on the ground, and when it has transitioned to flight. Commonly used
sensor inputs include weight-on-wheels indications measured at the landing gear and
airspeed thresholds.

TAWS System Basic GPWS Functionality
In addition to the TAWS specific functionality listed above, the required TSO-C92 GPWS
functionality must be included as well. These basic GPWS protection modes, shown in Table 21, are required to function even if the TAWS warning functionality fails due to a sensor,
processor, or loss of the TAWS terrain database.
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3. TESTING GPWS/TAWS SYSTEMS INSTALLED ON
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
Terrain warning systems, like all equipment installed on U.S. registered aircraft, must obtain
airworthiness approval from the FAA through the Type Certification or Supplemental Type
Certification process. This involves documenting the design, performance, and all details of the
system installation and integration with each type of aircraft [7]. In addition, a System Safety
Assessment must be conducted to establish all hazards associated with the installation, and to
define the failure modes and probability of failure, as well as impacts to aircraft operations, and
required mitigations to defined hazards.

FLIGHT TEST CONSIDERATIONS
The level of flight test required to validate a particular TAWS system installation depends on
the type of aircraft, avionics structure, and whether or not that particular system has been certified
in another application [7]. First time installations for a particular system or type of aircraft almost
always require flight test demonstration of required functionality. The addition of new sensors to
previously certified systems usually requires a limited flight test program to demonstrate system
operation in the modes affected by the sensor inputs. In the case where upgraded TAWS systems
are installed in a particular model aircraft that was previously equipped with some measure of
GPWS equipment from the same manufacturer, flight testing of the previous functionality may
not be required.

FLIGHT TEST TECHNIQUES
In general, flight testing is as simple as demonstrating that each mode shows proper activation,
deactivation after the cause of the warning is removed, and freedom from nuisance warnings.
8

GPWS Testing
The methods required for demonstrating GPWS are described in the following sections [8].
Mode 1
Establish several descent rates below 3,000 ft AGL, continuing until the warning is activated,
then pull-up until the warning is cleared. Minimum altitudes to safely recover the aircraft at each
descent rate are used as a safety back-up should the system fail to issue a warning.
Mode 2
Flight across smoothly rising terrain in level flight at 500 ft above the highest terrain feature at
different flap and gear settings.
Mode 3
After a normal takeoff, climb to 300 ft AGL and slow climb rate until a slight descent is
initiated to trigger a warning.
Mode 4
Fly an approach with the appropriate approach flaps setting while leaving the gear up until the
warning threshold is reached. A go-around is initiated at a safe altitude.
Mode 5
Conduct ILS approaches (During VMC) at varying deviations from the glide slope to trigger
warnings.

TAWS Functionality
TAWS functionality can be tested in a similar manner with relatively low risk [7] because of
the benign nature of the maneuvers required to initiate and clear warnings.

9

FLTA Mode
Flight test can be conducted in any area where the terrain or obstacle elevation is known. The
terrain or feature can be overflown while straight and level at no lower than 300 ft above the
known elevation to verify warning functionality.
PDA Mode
The premature descent mode can be tested in any area within 10 nmi of an airport that is
included in the terrain database. The threshold limits for the warnings can be easily and safely
explored to demonstrate proper system operation.
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4. APPLYING GPWS/TAWS SYSTEMS TO HIGH PERFORMANCE
AIRCRAFT
APPLICABILITY OF GPWS/TAWS SYSTEMS
Ground Proximity Warning and TAWS systems can be implemented in high performance
military aircraft, though both the integration and operation of the systems is usually quite
different from systems intended for use in commercial aircraft. The operating environment and
integration challenges combine to make these systems considerably different from their
commercial counterparts.

Integration
Most high performance aircraft have unique avionics systems structured for their particular
mission. These are usually based on state-of-the-art technology and are focused on providing the
high performance required, as well as being able to fit in a physically confined location. In
addition, the system architecture many times is distributed throughout the airframe with
considerable redundancy to increase survivability, but at a cost of increased complexity. This
requires that other systems to be integrated must conform to unique interface requirements, which
in turn drives a requirement for dedicated system development.

Operation
In addition to integration challenges, the operating envelope of high performance aircraft
drives system requirements to much greater complexity. The fact that the aircraft routinely
operate at high speed near terrain requires that the protection algorithms be based on completely
different assumptions than those in use in commercial systems. For instance, the altitude
clearance allowed by such systems prior to issuing warnings must by virtue of the aircraft
operating envelope be much smaller than commercial systems. In addition, the variety of external
11

stores configurations, and their effects on aircraft performance and the available recovery margin
adds to the problem. The effects of nuisance cues on the aircrew also drive elements of the
system design as well. Repeated nuisance cues can drastically alter the assumptions of aircrew
response, which must be assumed and modeled into the algorithms.

Flight Testing
The following sections describe one system designed for use in a tactical military high
performance aircraft, and the unique challenges presented by the environment in which it was
designed to operate, as well as the challenges in testing its proper operation safely.

12

5. TAWS ON THE F/A-18
OVERVIEW
The Enhanced Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) is the second generation of
the embedded Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), which was originally implemented
on F/A-18C/D model aircraft [11]. Both GPWS and TAWS are safety back-up systems designed
to reduce the probability of a Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain (CFIT) type mishap in Navy tactical
aircraft by alerting the aircrew when ground impact is imminent.
The original versions of GPWS were designed by the Naval Air Systems Command
Embedded GPWS Integrated Product Team (IPT) and documented in the form of an “Algorithm
Design Report”. This report was provided to the F/A-18 prime contractor (McDonell Douglas)
who implemented the design in assembly language on the aircraft’s mission computers. After
implementation, the algorithm was laboratory tested in the Manned Flight Simulator prior to
flight testing on a test aircraft. When the TAWS program was initiated, the decision was made to
have the Embedded GPWS IPT not only design the algorithm, but also implement it in the Ada
high level programming language. This software was then hosted on the aircraft’s digital map
computer to take advantage of the stored digital terrain data without facing the difficulty of
transferring that information to the aircraft mission computers. The algorithm is run on the
Tactical Aircraft Moving Map Computer (TAMMAC) using inputs from aircraft sensors and the
mission computers.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
The original GPWS system is limited by its primary altitude sensor, the radar altimeter
(RADALT). Because the RADALT is a look-down sensor, it cannot be used to determine the
terrain characteristics ahead of the aircraft. A history of the terrain behind the aircraft is available
13

and could be used in some instances, but is not indicative of the approaching terrain. This leaves
effectively no protection against flight into rising terrain or during flight over mountains. The
TAWS system overcomes this limitation with the introduction of accurate aircraft positioning and
a digital terrain database. The TAWS computes the expected recovery trajectory, in three
dimensions, and compares it with Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED). One critical
requirement is having accurate aircraft positioning relative to both the DTED database and the
world. The TAWS system combines data from many sensors to determine a position in threedimensional space that is used as the starting point for the recovery trajectory. When the
recovery trajectory intersects the DTED database, a warning is issued to the aircrew. The
warning is presented as an arrow on the Head-Up Display (HUD) that indicates the direction for
recovery, and a directive voice warning that indicates the proper response based on the flight
condition. The arrow and the voice warning continue until the warning condition no longer
exists. The voice warnings available are: “Pull-Up…Pull-Up”, “Roll-Left…Roll-Left”, “RollRight…Roll-Right”, “Power…Power”, and “Check Gear”.
In the event that accurate positioning data or the DTED database is unavailable, the TAWS
enters a mode that bases warnings solely on the altitude required to recover. This “flat Earth”
mode is very effective over water, as was proven during the earlier GPWS development.

SYSTEM TRADEOFFS
The TAWS system was designed to minimize nuisance warnings. Nuisance warnings are
defined as warnings that the aircrew deems unnecessary based upon their intentions and view of
the terrain. If nuisance warnings are accepted as a “necessary cost” of protecting the aircraft and
aircrew, TAWS becomes significantly less effective. This negative training causes the aircrew to
question each warning, thus delaying the start of the recovery if the aircrew deems the warning
14

valid. Any delay in responding to the warning will have catastrophic consequences as the aircraft
will no longer have sufficient altitude to successfully recover since TAWS warnings are issued at
the last instant that recovery is possible given the aircraft’s calculated performance. This design
bias towards a minimization of nuisance warnings is required for this system because of the lowaltitude and dynamic maneuvering mission requirements of the F/A-18. TAWS Warnings
normally occur three to seven seconds prior to terrain impact. The system requirements are for a
nuisance warning percentage of less than 8% (threshold) with an objective of less than 3%.

DESIGN DECISIONS

Configurable Parameters
The TAWS was intended to provide support for multiple platforms without software
modifications. (e.g., F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F). Therefore platform-specific characteristics
were identified and encapsulated as “configurable parameters” whose values may differ for each
installation. These parameters are loaded into predefined locations in the Digital Mapping
Computer (DMC) so that TAWS can effectively be customized for the desired platform, and
changes to the algorithm can be made without software modifications. The configurable
parameters are presented in appendix A, Table A-1. These parameters are loaded into the aircraft
on the mission data card inserted from the cockpit.

I/O Approach
The TAWS system is hosted on the Tactical Aircraft Moving Map Computer (TAMMAC) and
accepts its inputs from the aircraft mission computers in the form of three MIL-STD-1553
messages. Each message includes a counter, which allows the system to ensure that the messages
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come from the same MC frame, and are from a later frame than the last data received and
processed.

TAWS OPERATIONAL MODES
The TAWS uses three primary modes to define the level of operation, terrain database
availability, and warning condition. These three primary modes are BYPASS, COAST and
OPERATE.

BYPASS Mode
When System Mode is set to BYPASS, the TAWS processes all required inputs, but does not
execute warnings. The system mode is set to BYPASS when the sensor hierarchy determines that
the system does not have enough sensor information to provide protection, or the aircraft is in the
Weight-on-Wheels (WonW) condition.

COAST Mode
When System Mode is set to COAST, the TAWS processes all components and issues
warning cues based on an extrapolated height above terrain. The System Mode is set to COAST
when the System Mode is not in BYPASS, and DTED or accurate positioning is unavailable and
RADALT data is unavailable. Over relatively flat terrain, the extrapolated height above terrain is
based upon the last known terrain elevation. In the case where the last known height above
terrain was varying (ie above mountainous terrain), the COAST mode is not used.

OPERATE Mode
When the System Mode is set to OPERATE, the TAWS processes all components and issues
warning cues based upon measured height above terrain. The System Mode is set to OPERATE
when the conditions for BYPASS and COAST are not met.
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Terrain Definition Mode
In addition to the primary operating mode, the system defines a Terrain Definition Mode
which is determined based on whether or not the TAWS is using the Re-arced Digital Terrain
Elevation Data (RDTED) database for protection. The Terrain Definition Mode can either be
DTED or FLAT EARTH.
DTED
When the Terrain Definition Mode is set to DTED (DTED mode), the TAWS provides
protection against flight into all types of terrain (rising, level, and descending). The Terrain
Definition Mode is set to DTED when RDTED is available for the current location, the TAWS
has accurately determined its position, and the system is not in the landing phase.
FLAT EARTH
When the Terrain Definition Mode is set to FLAT EARTH, the system provides warnings only
against descending flight into level or descending terrain. The Terrain Definition Mode is set to
FLAT EARTH whe n RDTED is unavailable (including over the ocean), or when the system
cannot accurately determine its position, or is in the landing phase.

SYSTEM WARNINGS
The system provides several different types of warnings loosely grouped into either GEAR or
TRAJECTORY warnings.

GEAR Warning
A GEAR warning is issued when the system determines that a gear-up landing is about to
occur while in the landing phase of flight. The criteria for setting the GEAR warning is:
• The Aircraft is below 150 feet AGL, and
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• Is below 200 KCAS, and
• The aircraft is descending, and
• More than 60 seconds have elapsed since a waveoff or takeoff, and
• The landing gear is not down and locked.

While in the landing flight phase, the system operates in the FLAT EARTH mode. Protection
is still provided by comparing the altitude required to recover the aircraft and the height above
terrain, but once a landing attempt is confirmed, the TAWS adds additional protection to ensure
that a gear-up landing is not about to happen. The system Landing Phase is defined as:

• Altitude less than 500 feet AGL, and
• Airspeed less than 200 KCAS, and
• More than 60 seconds since a waveoff or takeoff.

The GEAR Warning Mode is cleared when the TAWS receives the down-and-locked
indication, the aircraft begins climbing, the height above terrain climbs above 150 feet, or the
system leaves the landing phase. In all warning and cancellation conditions, the warning
condition (or cancellation criteria) must be met for three frames before the warning mode is
actually set (or cleared) in the fourth frame. These persistency timers protect the TAWS from
erroneously setting warnings (or clearing warnings) based on bad transient input data.

TRAJECTORY Warning
A TRAJECTORY warning is issued when the system determines that a high probability of a
CFIT exists. That is, the current flight path will intercept the ground unless an aggressive
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recovery is initiated immediately. This protection is available at all airspeeds and flight
conditions. However, TAWS Warnings are inhibited when:

• Within 6 seconds of WonW to weight-off-wheels transition, or
• Within 1.1 seconds of transitioning from the BYPASS mode, or
• The TAWS computed height-above-terrain is less than zero.

SYS TEM SENSOR INPUTS
Signal processing selects data from many sources and produces what is deemed the most
accurate Height Above Terrain (HAT), height above Mean Sea Level (MSL), aircraft velocities,
position, and accelerations. Two basic sources of height above terrain are used: the RADALT,
and the difference between aircraft MSL altitude and the terrain height from the RDTED
database. Error estimates are computed for each of these sources so that the proper weighting can
be made for each one.
To achieve full performance, data is required from the following aircraft systems: Inertial
Navigation System (INS), RADALT, Air Data Computer (ADC), and GPS. RDTED is also
required from the Digital Map Computer (DMC). Some failures (or unavailability) of these
inputs will invalidate the TAWS, while other failures will only degrade performance to varying
degrees.
Table A-2 (Appendix A) shows the hierarchy of sensors used for each input to the TAWS and
the effects of sensor failures. As an example, TAWS is in its fully capable mode when the INS
reports valid attitude and acceleration, GPS is used for position (either aiding the INS or standalone), and DTED is available.
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Terrain Height Determination
The TAWS algorithm queries the DMC to acquire DTED information. The DMC returns
RDTED, which contains terrain heights (gridposts) spaced roughly 150 meters apart at midlatitudes. The DMC returns an elevation, which is the weighted average (using bilinear
interpolation) of the four closest RDTED gridposts surrounding the input latitude and longitude.
The RDTED was derived from the original Level I DTED, which has gridposts spaced at 3 arc
seconds, which equates to 100 meters at the equator, and decreases toward the poles. The DTED
is re-arced to support the TAMMAC map scale. As more precise DTED becomes available, the
TAMMAC will handle the Level-II data and pass it to the TAWS with no loss of functionality,
but with greater precision.
The TAWS algorithm requests RDTED from the position on the globe that is one frame ahead
of the current aircraft position instead of the “current” position. This allows the system to
measure the difference in neighboring gridpost heights, by collecting data one frame in front of
the aircraft as well as behind. The TAWS uses differences in neighboring gridpost heights in
calculating a nuisance warning buffer. The TAWS converts the DTED into feet and sets up an
array of three DTED points: in front of (next), under (current), and behind (last) the aircraft.
Three DTED points were chosen to minimize potential map registration errors in terrain data
local to the aircraft position. It looks up the next point each frame, passes the value of next to
current, and current to last. The “current” values are used for calculations, while the others are
kept for determining variation in heights at neighboring locations.
The TAWS calculates the terrain variation by measuring the difference in DTED terrain
heights both behind (where the aircraft has been) and ahead (where it is going) of the current
point. “Behind” is measured by finding the difference between DTED heights every frame, and
exponentially decaying the values over time, so the variation over the last 2 gridposts
(approximately 1000 ft) is weighted at 50%. This method measures both jaggedness and rising or
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falling terrain. “Ahead” is measured by a “terrain roughness” parameter passed to the algorithm
from the DMC, which finds the variation from a smooth slope of the next 15 gridpost heights
(approximately 7400 ft). Fifteen was chosen because it represents the length of a typical recovery
trajectory. These two measures are then averaged to get the estimate of terrain variation, which
determines how large the DTED and RADALT errors might be.

Determining Aircraft Position
The TAWS needs accurate position and altitude information to properly process potential
warning conditions. The system then uses the position error as an estimate of what is commonly
known as “map registration error”. The DTED database is populated with terrain heights for
specific latitude / longitude locations, and if the aircraft queries the database with a location that it
believes it is at, but in reality the aircraft is somewhere else, a map registration error occurs
because the terrain height returned is for a location other than where the aircraft is.
When the GPS errors are acceptable (less than a defined limit of 80 ft), the position error
parameter is set to the GPS horizontal position error (HERR) returned by the GPS receiver. If the
GPS validity bit is FALSE, the position error parameter grows at the rate of 2 ft/sec. This is the
expected INS drift rate, based on historical data for the ASN-139 INS. The value of 80 ft was
chosen for two reasons: first, the GPS accuracy specifications indicate (and historical data from
F/A-18 tests validate) that when working properly, the HERR should be less than 80 ft the vast
majority of the time. Secondly, analyses of F/A-18 flight tests show that aircraft banking or
pitching maneuvers tend to cause the GPS measurement errors (including the HERR) to
immediately jump to much higher values (i.e., 400 ft), even while the aircraft maintains accurate
position. In other words, the HERR does not reflect the true position error for these temporary
situations, so the TAWS assigns the position error to grow more slowly (with the INS drift).
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Determining Aircraft Altitude And Altitude Error
When the GPS reported vertical error (VERR) is less than 80 ft, the GPS altitude is used for
the best MSL altitude parameter. If the VERR is greater than 80 ft, the barometric altitude is used
instead, as historical data shows if the VERR is greater than 80 ft, the barometric altitude is likely
to be more accurate and should be used instead. In the case where the aircraft enters the transonic
region, the last reported “non-transonic” value is used and updated using the inertial damped
barometric parameter.
Accurate aircraft altitude is considerably more difficult to determine than position, because of
sensor accuracy. Signal Processing keeps track of which MSL sensor is being used, so that
adjustments can be made to the height-above-terrain estimate whenever the logic switches among
the various choices. Sensory hierarchy is as follows:
GPS Altitude
The GPS altitude value is used when the VERR has been less than 80 ft within the past 50
seconds. If the VERR is acceptable (< 80 ft), the altitude error is set equal to the VERR. When
the VERR is greater than 80 ft, the estimate of altitude error is increased by 2 ft/sec only if the
INS altitude differs from the GPS altitude by more than the altitude error estimate. This is done
so that a spike in bad GPS data will not instantaneously raise the estimate of the altitude error.
Instead, it will grow by as much as 100 ft over 50 seconds, and only then if the GPS altitude
really is different than the INS BARO altitude.
INS Altitude
The INS BARO altitude is used when INS is valid, and GPS is not valid. First, there is a
check to see if the INS altitude differs from the ADC barometric altitude by more than 800 ft,
while the aircraft is not in the transonic region. This is done because the F/A-18 has altitudeprocessing logic, which can add a 900-ft bias to the INS altitude while transonic. This check
ensures INS BARO altitude is not used in these conditions. The worst case error specification for
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barometric altitude error is 8.3% of altitude, so to estimate the one-sigma error, the larger of 75 ft
and one-half of the specification error (4.15%) is used. The altitude error is increased by 2 ft/sec
until the error reaches the one-sigma value. However, when the BARO and GPS altitudes agree,
the altitude is assumed good and the error estimate will not grow larger.
Barometric Altitude
The lowest priority is the ADC barometric altitude: and is used when both the GPS and INS
are not valid.

CFIT PROTECTION
The Protection component of the TAWS determines if ground impact is imminent for the two
mutually exclusive warning modes, GEAR and TRAJECTORY. If impact is imminent, the
appropriate warning mode is set and the warning is issued. In most cases, CFIT protection is
provided by checking the predicted recovery trajectory against the terrain database and
determining if the two intersect. When they do intersect, the TRAJECTORY Warning Mode is
set until the predicted trajectory no longer intersects the terrain database. When the TAWS is in
the FLAT EARTH mode, the terrain database is not used for determining a warning condition. In
this case, the TRAJECTORY Warning Mode is set when the altitude required to recover the
aircraft is greater than or equal to the current height above the terrain plus a clearance altitude.
This is applicable only while over level or descending terrain. No protection into rising terrain is
provided while in FLAT EARTH mode.
The TRAJECTORY Warning Mode provides protection by monitoring the altitude required to
recover the aircraft and the height above the terrain. Depending upon the sensor validity,
availability of DTED, and flight phase, this may be accomplished by projecting the recovery
trajectory in three-dimensions and overlaying it on the RDTED database (DTED Terrain
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Definition Mode), or comparing the altitude required for recovery to the height above terrain
(FLAT EARTH Terrain Definition Mode).

Recovery Trajectories
Within the DTED mode, two recovery trajectories are computed to overlay the RDTED
database. The Vertical Recovery Trajectory (VRT) assumes the pilot will roll to wings-level,
then apply a longitudinal pull to a constant 5g (or 80% of the aircraft available g if Nz limited).
The Oblique Recovery Trajectory (ORT) assumes the pilot will simply apply a longitudinal pull
at whatever the current bank angle is. At zero bank angle, the ORT and VRT are identical. The
two recovery trajectories are shown in Figure 5-1.
For a warning condition to exist, both calculated trajectories must intersect the terrain in the
RDTED database, which helps avoid nuisance warnings. This is especially important in
mountainous terrain where the aircrew can see a turn in a valley and intend to maneuver through

Figure 5-1
VRT and ORT Recovery Trajectories
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it, but the VRT detects potential ground impact because of the assumption that the aircraft will
roll to wings-level and then pull up. This assumption causes the VRT to intersect the side of the
valley that the aircrew is already aware of and maneuvering around. Within the FLAT EARTH
mode, the altitude required for recovery is based solely on the altitude lost during the VRT.

Recovery Phases
The recovery is broken into five phases: pilot response, roll response, G delay phase, G-onset
phase, and dive phase. The intention is to accurately model both the VRT and ORT in real time
according to the aircraft’s instantaneous performance capability. In each phase of the recovery
(except for the dive phase), the time to complete that phase is computed and used in kinematic
equations that define position, velocity, and acceleration.
Pilot response phase
The pilot response phase is the period from when the aircrew receives the warning cues to
when the first action is taken to affect the recovery (lateral stick for roll-out, longitudinal stick for
pull-up, etc.). This “processing” time is rather short for a pilot with high situational awareness,
and longer for a pilot who has lost situational awareness. Simulator and flight test from the
GPWS development program showed that a highly aware pilot could react as fast as 0.4 seconds,
and an unaware pilot could take 1.0 second or longer.
Predicting the pilot response time is very difficult due to this range in actual responses. While
the goal is to protect the unaware pilot, selection of too large a pilot response time leads to
nuisance warnings for the aware pilot. Therefore, based on the results of eight years of GPWS
development and testing, a pilot response time of 1.3 seconds is used for the TAWS. This value
was increased after the first phase of flight test due to the desire to increase protection and
because nuisance warnings were non-existent.
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Roll Response Phase
The roll response phase is the period from when the aircrew initiates recovery to when the
aircraft reaches the calculated target bank angle required to clear terrain. If no roll is required for
the recovery (VRT with small bank angle or ORT), the roll response phase will be nonexistent for
that frame.
The predicted roll response takes into account the platform-specific performance
characteristics. The roll performance characteristics assume that 50% lateral stick is used for
initial bank angles less than 70°, and 75% lateral stick for those greater than 70°. These
conservative assumptions allow the aircrew to roll faster than designed which may increase the
bottom-out altitude.
When the TAWS is in the DTED mode, the roll response phase, as well as the subsequent
phases, must be computed twice per frame. The first pass is for the VRT, which assumes a target
bank angle of zero. The second pass is for the ORT, which assumes the target bank angle is the
bank angle at the end of the pilot response phase.
G Onset Delay Phase
The aircraft now has the lift vector pointing in the desired direction when the aircrew begins
pulling to the target normal acceleration. As the pilot applies aft stick, the horizontal stabilizer
moves to a more trailing-edge up condition. This causes downward motion of the tail and
eventually the nose pitch-up normally associated with the stick deflection. The tail moves
downward because the deflection of the horizontal stabilizer creates a downward force. This
downward force instantaneously reduces the overall lift the aircraft is generating though it is
quickly compensated for by the nose pitching up. The reduction of lift before it increases is seen
as a short-term reduction in normal acceleration on the aircraft. This is referred to as a nonminimum phase response and is accounted for in this phase.
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In addition, the F/A-18 flight control system also uses a G-limiter to ensure the aircrew does
not exceed the structural limit of the airframe. The limit value for the G-limiter is reduced during
transonic flight to alleviate overstresses due to the highly dynamic nature of transonic flight.
Because TAWS allows for accelerations (and decelerations) during the predicted recovery
trajectories, and the change in G-limiter threshold during transonic flight can greatly affect the
recovery trajectory, the TAWS must account for this transonic “G-bucket”. This means that in
addition to the predicted ground and air speeds, the TAWS must predict the mach number at
various points of the recovery.
G Onset Phase
The G-onset phase of the recovery is the time from the application of aft stick to the time that
the target normal acceleration is achieved. This may be in the vertical plane (VRT) or in an
oblique plane (ORT). If the current normal acceleration is greater than or equal to the target,
there is no G-onset phase. The target G-onset rate is computed from the airspeed, gross weight,
and external stores configuration. This estimate is based upon historical flight test data and an
F/A-18 high-fidelity airframe simulation. The assumed recovery technique is ramped aft stick
(over 0.75 seconds) sufficient to achieve the target normal acceleration.
Dive Phase
Once the recovery enters the dive phase, the required pilot maneuvering is over. Above
approximately corner speed (and for the ORT), the dive phase is assumed a constant normal
acceleration constant airspeed maneuver whose trajectory is very closely approximated by an
ellipse. Below cornering speed (and for the VRT), the dive phase is assumed to have axial
acceleration due to the pilot applying maximum power. This axial acceleration causes an
increase in airspeed and therefore an increase in the target normal acceleration for the dive phase
(especially notable during slow speed conditions). For the vertical recovery trajectory, the ellipse
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is in the vertical plane. For the oblique recovery trajectory, the ellipse is rotated about the flight
path in the body axis and about vertical in the inertial axis.
Recovery Trajectory Calculation
The VRT begins at the current aircraft position and ends when the aircraft is climbing
vertically. Figure 5-2 shows a VRT broken into its phases.
Fifteen samples are taken along the trajectory and are spaced as:
• 3 samples from the roll phase
• 3 samples from the G-onset phase
• 9 samples from the dive phase at equal intervals in horizontal translation

Figure 5-2
Vertical Recovery Trajectory [11]
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Fifteen samples are used because in the worst case, the aircraft is capable of traversing fifteen
RDTED gridposts during the recovery (15 gridposts = 7380 feet). This division of samples was
chosen to reflect phases where the recovery could indeed be completed. That is, due to the pilot
response characteristics, a recovery has very little chance of being completed during the pilot
response phase. Similarly, the G-delay phase is so short (< 0.5 sec) and bounded by the roll and
G-onset phases that it is effectively represented by them.
The oblique recovery trajectory is computed after the VRT computations are complete. The
ORT, like the VRT, begins at the current aircraft position, but it ends at different points,
depending upon the bank angle. The ORT uses between 10 and 15 samples along the trajectory,
shown in Figure 5-3. This is done to avoid nuisance warnings during maneuvers in confined
areas such as canyons or below mountain peaks where the ORT may actually predic t an
intersection behind the turning aircraft. Even though the number of samples used in the terrain
intersection computation is variable, fifteen points are still computed along the entire ellipse.

Warning Determination
Once the samples for each recovery trajectory are computed, the terrain elevation at each
sample is compared with the predicted aircraft altitude along the trajectory plus the clearance
altitude, which in the case of the F/A-18 is 50 ft. Each trajectory sample contains the latitude,
longitude and altitude of the aircraft along the trajectory. The latitude and longitude are used to
query the DTED database for the elevation at that point. When the terrain elevation returned
from the DTED database is greater than or equal to the predicted altitude, a potential warning
exists.
When the RDTED terrain elevation exceeds the predicted altitude at any sample, the terrain
elevation is also examined at points to the left and right of the intersection point, perpendicular to
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Figure 5-3
Oblique Recovery Trajectory [11]

the trajectory, thus making the trajectory appear like the shape of a “T”. This is done because in
mountainous terrain, a potential warning at one latitude/longitude may not require a warning at a
different location. Any map registration errors or the potential of aircraft maneuvering during the
recovery are accounted for with the “T” when ascertaining that a warning is required. The
distance right and left of the trajectory to check is the maximum of the position error and oneeighth of the distance from beginning of trajectory to the intersection point in the horizontal
plane. Only when all three terrain elevations are greater than or equal to the trajectory altitude
will a potential warning exist.
A TRAJECTORY warning can be set only when both the VRT and ORT are detecting an
intercept. Whenever trajectory protection detects an intercept (along the trajectory and "T" for
VRT, or along the trajectory for ORT), a persistency counter for the appropriate trajectory is
incremented until four consecutive frames of intercept occur. Once one of the persistency
counters reaches four, a warning is set as soon as the persistency counter for the "other" trajectory
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becomes non-zero. The system thus determines which trajectory describes "the way out" and is
conveyed to the aircrew as the directive recovery cue. This is used by the mission computer to
determine whether the recovery arrow on the HUD should be ground or aircraft stabilized as
described below.

Once the TRAJECTORY Warning Mode has been set, it is cleared by four

consecutive frames of no intercepts on either trajectory.
When the TAWS is in the FLAT EARTH mode, there is no need to compute the trajectory
points as above since no digital terrain data is used for comparison. FLAT EARTH mode
requires only the altitude required to arrest the downward velocity to the targeted value. This is
determined using the kinematic updates from each phase. The end of the recovery while in the
FLAT EARTH mode occurs when the aircraft is parallel to the terrain, and is determined from the
terrain slope that is computed in the signal processing component.

Clearance Altitude
The clearance altitude is the designed bottom-out altitude for the recovery. The value of the
clearance altitude is based upon whether the TAWS is in the landing phase or not. While in the
landing phase, the clearance altitude is the configurable parameter Landing_Clearance_Altitude,
the altitude at which the target downward velocity is to be achieved during landing. While not in
the landing phase, the clearance altitude is Cruise_Clearance_Altitude. (The configurable
parameters and their values are listed in Table A-2)

TAWS WARNING MECHANIZATION
When the system determines a warning is in order, the mission computers provide both visual
and aural warnings to the pilot.
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Aural Warnings
The audio cues are intended to be the primary warning cue, and are presented simultaneously
with the visual cues. The voice warnings are 3-6 dB above normal cockpit communications with
a female voice inflection that communicates the sense of urgency of the situation. Multiple audio
warnings will be issued during the recovery if the situation requires. Each audio cue is issued so
that the aircrew will hear the entire directive cue, and cannot be interrupted. This is a hardware
limitation with the amplifier, control intercommunication (ACI), which generates all F/A-18
audio cueing. The warnings are issued until the warning condition no longer exists.
Aural warnings consist of the following cues:
• “Roll Left, Roll Left”
• “Roll Right, Roll Right”
• “Pull-Up, Pull Up”
• “Power, Power”
• “Check Gear”
Multiple aural cues may be required for a single recovery. For example, most ORT recoveries
issue a “Roll Left/Right” followed by “Pull Up”.

Visual Cues
The video cueing consists of the “TAWS arrow” presented in the HUD with at least the same
intensity as the surrounding HUD symbology. The arrow is 50 mr wide and 150 mr high (for the
F/A-18 implementation), drawn around the optical center of the HUD. The arrow has a notch in
the bottom so that the direction of the arrow can be ascertained from either the top or bottom. In
some cases, the top of the arrow may not be instantaneously visible in the HUD. The arrow
remains on the HUD as long as the Warning Mode is set.
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There are two orientations for the arrow in the HUD, set according to the commanded
recovery trajectory. For the Vertical Recovery Trajectory, the arrow will be presented
perpendicula r to the horizon; that is, pointing “up” in the inertial coordinate system, as shown in
Figure 5-4 where the aircraft is shown rolled 45 deg left.
For the Oblique Recovery Trajectory, the arrow will remain fixed to the aircraft’s Z-axis
pointing “up”, as shown in Figure 5-5. The orientation of the arrow is dependent upon the
parameter desired recovery path determined by the TAWS algorithm.

33

350

000

010

5

-390

400

544

α 4.8
M 0.4 5
G 1.0
6.5

5

5

Figure 5-4
HUD Indications for Vertical Recovery Trajectory
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Figure 5-5
HUDIndications for ORT Recovery
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6. FLIGHT TESTING TAWS ON THE F/A-18

Just as the maneuvering envelope and mission requirements define the system design for
terrain warning systems on military aircraft, the requirements for testing such a system are
likewise expanded when compared with those intended for commercial aircraft. Flight testing the
TAWS system recently developed for the F/A-18 provides an example.

BACKGROUND
Development of the F/A-18 TAWS system required a large number of tests to validate the
approach and assumptions inherent in the system design. Numerous simulation events were
required to tweak the algorithms to provide the maximum amount of protection while minimizing
nuisance warnings. Flight testing was also required to validate that the system did not provide
nuisance warnings while the aircraft was operating in it intended environment performing
tactically relevant missions.
The TAWS test effort was undertaken as an integrated system test involving multiple test
techniques using both simulation and flight tests. Complementary use of simulation and flight
test using altitude safety buffers and a host of risk mitigations was the key to developing a robust
safety system that minimizes nuisance warnings. The objectives of the flight test program are
summarized in Table 6-1.
Flight testing was carried out in several phases with both F/A-18C/D and E/F variant aircraft,
which are aerodynamically very different, in order to verify that the configurable parameters were
optimized for each. Two categories of flight testing were required: performance flight testing and
nuisance cue testing. Since TAWS was designed to be a last-ditch safety system, it obviously
could not be flight tested safely in its intended operating environment. Because of this, a number
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Table 6-1
F/A-18 TAWS Test Requirements and Evaluation Criteria [10]
REQUIREMENT
Ensure warning cues
appear at the design
thresholds/time

Ensure trajectory
components and bottom
out altitudes.

TESTS
Pilot maneuvers aircraft to
generate terrain closure, excessive
sink rate, excessive bank angle,
floor altitude and gear up
warnings. Recover aircraft.
Exercise mode transitions.
Pilot maneuvers aircraft into
trajectory warning. Upon receipt
of aural/visual cues, pilot
executes recovery.

Ensure that the number of Normal fleet operations which
nuisance cues has been
approach warning boundaries:
minimized
• Low level flight operations
• Simulated weapons
delivery at minimum
altitudes
• LAT
• Off nominal approaches
• VFR approaches, etc.
Ensure that assumed
parameters are sufficient
to prevent CFIT
following loss of
Situational Awareness
(SA).
Investigate pilot response,
roll out, G-onset,
sustained G, and bottom
out altitude.
Test for false cues caused
by spurious signals (data
spikes, wingman, power
interruptions, etc.)

Test pilot closes his eyes to
simulate loss of SA; aircraft is
then maneuvered into simulated
CFIT situation by the safety pilot.
Test pilot initiates recovery at
warning.

All flight tests and formation
flight.
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CRITERIA
Warnings/transitions as
designed.

Actual vs. computed
warning altitude within
greater of either:
10% of trajectory altitude or
100 ft.
Nuisance Cues: less than
8% of the intended
maneuvers/events. For Low
leve l flight operations 1
minute of flight equals 1
event.
P nw less than 8%
(threshold)
P nw less than 3%
(objective)
P sw greater than 60%
(threshold)
P sw greater than 90%
(objective)

No false cues.

of special techniques were developed to safely conduct flight test while measuring system
performance to the maximum extent possible.

UNIQUE SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
Because of the nature of this flight testing, there was a considerable amount of attention given
to planning the profiles. The desire to test as close to the ground as possible for accurate aircraft
performance and pilot perception needed to be delicately balanced with the required altitude
buffer in order to ensure safety. Some unique methods were developed to provide as much
margin for safety as possible, while fulfilling the flight test requirements.

Flight Test Safety Buffer Altitude
The aircraft mission computer software was modified to allow the use of a temporary false
floor altitude that raised the perceived terrain elevation above the real terrain, allowing flight test
to be conducted farther from the ground. When the aircraft was configured for flight test, the
pilot was presented with an option to enter a buffer altitude between 0 and 12,700 feet . This
buffer is then subtracted from the TAWS final height above terrain parameter and MSL altitudes
used in all warning calculations. This buffer did not change the indicated altitude presented to the
pilot, or the responses of the aircraft low-altitude warning system which is composed of an MSL
altitude warning setting and the radar altimeter (RADALT) warning setting.
Each time the buffer was enabled or the altitude setting changed, the buffer check procedure
was performed to verify that it was working properly. This involved descending at approximately
300 fpm to verify the warning at 50 ft above the false floor altitude. The 300 fpm was used to
standardize the procedure at a descent rate low enough so that the warning would not appear
higher than the minimum 50 ft warning provided when a slow descent toward the ground was
occurring. (Higher descent rates would move the warning higher.) The buffer check flight test
card is presented in Figure 6-1.
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Profile Planning
All dive profiles were planned using the Aircraft Target Area Maneuvering Simulation
(ATAMS) weaponeering program using worst-case aircraft gross weight and test conditions.
Tolerances for dive angle and airspeed were defined, and using the worst case of all parameters
that contribute, the expected altitude loss was calculated for every event. The ATAMS altitudes
were used because they are slightly more conservative than those derived from the TACMAN
dive recovery charts.
The expected altitude lost was used to determine the “terminate run altitude” which was the
minimum altitude allowable to ensure the aircraft recovered above the “bottom out altitude.”
Table 6-2 shows the bottom out altitudes that were used, which differed as a function of dive
angle.
Using the terminate run altitude and minimum bottom out altitude, the required buffer altitude
could be determined so that the expected TAWS warning could be forced away from the terrain
for testing. Buffer altitudes were chosen so that there was ample time during the dive for the
expected TAWS warning to be given and the recovery started prior to the terminate run altitude.
Figure 6-2 shows the relationship between the various altitude parameters.

Safety Observers and Displays
Even though the safety altitudes were defined, it was determined that the test team needed to
monitor the altitudes and other safety critical parameters to be prepared to make knock-it-off calls
at the terminate run altitude if the TAWS system failed to provide warnings. The test team was
Table 6-2
Minimum Dive Recovery Bottom Out Altitudes
DIVE ANGLE (Degrees)
0-9
10-19
20-37
38-50

BOTTOM OUT ALTITUDE (ft)
500
1000
2000
3000
39

Flight Event:

F/A-18 Advanced Weapons Lab

214/107

Flight Date:

12/20/01

Buffer Setting/Check

5,200 AGL
300 ± 30
KCAS
0° ± 10° AOB

MSTR MODE: NAV
MSTR ARM: SAFE
WPN:

HUD

Software Altitude
Warnings
BARO: 8,100
RDR: 0

VIDEO:
HUD LCAM
VTR 1 VTR 2

LCAM LCAM
VTR 3 VTX

1. Set Safety Buffer:
Unit 28
Address
21016
Data 11754 (5,100 ft)
2. Set RALT min
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Figure 6-1
Flight Test Buffer Check Card
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Figure 6-2
Safety Altitude Parameter Definitions [10]
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organized with a safety observer and the test conductor monitoring displays in the control room to
provide an independent abort call if required during each run.

Telemetry Data System
To do this, a number of aircraft parameters had to be telemetered to the ground. The standard
flight test telemetry (TM) system on the F/A-18 test aircraft was capable of monitoring all of the
required parameters, and sending them to the China Lake Range Control Center (RCC) bays in
real time. The required parameters are listed in Table 6-3.
In addition, it was determined that the test team should use an alternate altitude source to make
the abort determination in case the altitude sensors aboard the aircraft (which were of course also
used as inputs to the TAWS system) should provide inaccurate data. For this reason, the aircraft
was configured with an Advanced Range Data System (ARDS) pod, which uses differential GPS
to determine precise Time/Space/Position Information (TSPI) and relayed it to the RCC bays.
Safety Displays
Because of the very dynamic nature of the safety data, a determination was made to design
some special displays to show the required information graphically in order to ensure that it was
evaluated correctly during each event. For the CFIT protection flights, a graphical display was
developed which plotted altitude and dive angle against a template showing the dive angle
tolerances and terminate run altitude, so that it was relatively easy to determine if the aircraft was
outside the envelope which determined the altitude lost during recovery. A sample display is
shown in Figure 6-3. Note that the altitude is shown as AGL altitude. As mentioned, an
independent altitude source was used to drive the safety display, however, the ARDS pod
provided only MSL altitude, which was converted to worst case AGL altitude by assuming a
suitable terrain height. The highest terrain in the range area was used, which resulted in a
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Table 6-3
Required Real-Time Data Parameters [10]
Critical Test Parameters
Airspeeds (VCAL, VTRUE)
Dive Angle
Radar Altitude
Baro Altitude
TSPI Altitude
Vertical Velocity
Bank Angle
Stick position
TSPI Lat/Long
Hot Mike to RCC

Critical Safety Parameters
Airspeeds (VCAL, VTRUE)
Dive Angle
Altitude (ft AGL)
Normal Acceleration (Nz (G))
Mach Number
Angle of Attack

conservative estimate of actual aircraft AGL altitude, depending on the terrain below. The dive
angle data was taken from the aircraft telemetry stream. Several other similar displays were
developed for use during nuisance warning testing, where no altitude buffer was used. The LowAltitude Tactics (LAT) display is shown in Figure 6-4.
LAT maneuvers were performed over level ground, so the known terrain elevation was used in
conjunction with the ARDS altitude data to provide accurate AGL altitude for use on the display
without resorting to aircraft derived data. This provided for an extra measure of protection with
accuracy that supported the desire to test to a minimum altitude of 200 ft.
A similar display, shown in Figure 6-5 was used for weapons delivery profile nuisance
warning testing.

Safety Pilot
The use of a back-seat safety pilot was mandated for some of the testing, to ensure that if the
primary pilot were to be disoriented, there would be some means of recovering the aircraft. This
was particularly important for the “closed eyes” CFIT testing where the front seat pilot was
deliberately disoriented to evaluate the recovery performance of the system when the pilot had
43
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Figure 6-3
CFIT Protection Flight Test Safety Display
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Figure 6-4
LAT Dive Recovery Safety Display
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Figure 6-5
Weapons Delivery Profile Safety Display
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suffered a loss of situational awareness – a primary reason for implementing the TAWS system.
The primary test aircraft was configured in the “trainer configuration” with flight controls in both
the front and aft cockpits.

Simulator Requirements
In addition to the heavy use of the Manned Flight Simulator for algorithm development, the
simulator was used to pre-fly all test points. It was deemed a safety requirement that all aircrew
develop and maintain proficiency for TAWS testing prior to actual flight test events. This also
helped develop the starting points for some of the more difficult scenarios, which were very
dependent on technique used to get the aircraft to the required point in the sky with the proper
attitude and airspeed desired. Table 6-4 summarizes the simulator requirements for both primary
Test Pilot and Safety Pilot for the different events.

ADDITIONAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
In addition, a number of common flight test “best practices” were used in combination to
assure maximum safety. The concept of “build-up” was applied, which dictated that the events
be done in a particular order with the functional flights flown first. This also drove the desire to
flight test at higher altitudes before moving the profiles either faster or lower. Likewise, practice
events and those with lower g-onset rates were flown first.
Also, the Naval Air Systems Command Test Hazard Analysis process was applied to all
aspects of this flight test program to identify, categorize and attempt to mitigate all identified
risks. Each identified risk was mitigated in some way, and then the residual risk was assessed for
severity and probability in order to categorize the remaining risk. The residual risk matrix is
presented in Table 6-5.
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Table 6-4
Pilot/Flight Simulator Proficiency Requirements [10]

Flight

MFS flight

Practice Flight

Functional Test

Required within 45 days prior to
functional test flight.

None required.

Low level 1

None required.

None required.

LAT Test pilot 2

Required within 30 days prior to
LAT practice flight.6

Required within 14 days prior to
LAT test flight.6

Required within 30 days prior to
LAT practice flight.6

Back or front seat practice flight
required within 14 days prior to
LAT test flight. 4,6

LAT Safety pilot 3
CFIT Test pilot 7

Required within 45 days prior to
CFIT test flight.

None required.

CFIT Safety pilot

Required within 45 days prior to
CFIT test flight.

None required.

7

Simulated
Weapon Delivery
profiles

Required within 45 days prior to
weapons test flight.

Off Nominal
Approaches 5

None required

None required.
None required.

Notes: 1.
2.
3.
4.

Must have flown 500 ft low level test flight prior to 200 ft (same route).
Must have been F/A-18 LAT qualified.
Must have previously completed a LAT instructor course.
Must have flown 500 ft or lower low level within 14 days prior to LAT practice
flight.
5. LSO required
6. Must have flown within 7 days prior to flying LAT.
7. Refresher required within 15 days of test flight.
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The complete Test Hazard Analysis for the F/A-18 TAWS test program is listed in appendix
B. The overall flight test category was assessed as Category B, which determined the level of
oversight and test team qualifications.
Another standard flight test practice that was used was the use of chase aircraft. This was
mandated for some flights, in order to provide an external appraisal of potential dangerous
attitude trends while in the low-level environment. This was primarily used for the LAT nuisance
testing, and is representative of fleet training practice.
The aforementioned test techniques and practices were all implemented in order to minimize
risk. The following sections describe the flight tests in detail as well as the test techniques used
to ensure safety.

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TESTING
Performance flight tests were segregated into three types, and conducted in accordance with
logical build-up for a developmental system.

Functional Warning Verification
The first phase of flight test was dedicated to verification of basic system functionality. The
flight test safety buffer altitude (discussed in a later section) was verified, an evaluation of aircraft
positioning and DTED accuracy was performed, as well as a verification of the graceful
degradation of the system when DTED data was invalid or position information was limited.
After basic warning functionality was verified by diving towards the ground (with safety buffer),
the forward looking capability of the system was evaluated. This was done by picking a terrain
feature on the range with abrupt sides and flying directly toward it to verify warnings. Figure 6-6
shows the terrain feature used (renamed “TAWS Mountain” by the test team).
These tests were conducted using several profiles with the aircraft RADALT both on and off,
with the aircraft configured in a “light” configuration with only a center-line external fuel tank
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Table 6-5
Residual Risk Matrix
Hazard Severity
Mishap
Probability

I

II

III

IV

Catastrophic

Critical

Marginal

Negligible

A - Frequent

UA

UA

Risk Category C

Risk Category B

B - Probable

UA

Risk Category C

Risk Category C

Risk Category A

COccasional

(Note 1)

Risk Category C

Risk Category B

Risk Category A

D - Remote

(Note 2)

(Note 2)

Risk Category A

Risk Category A

Notes:
1. The determination of a test project whose residual risk assessment falls under I/C will
require up front discussions with TCT prior to proceeding with the test program
development.
2. Assignment of Risk Category where residual risk falls under I/D or II/D will require up
front discussions with the TCT to determine whether Risk Category A or B is applicable.
3. UA - Unacceptable risk, project residual risk too high to proceed.
4. Risk Category C - Test or activities which present a significant risk to personnel,
equipment or property, even after all precautionary/corrective actions are taken.
5. Risk Category B - Test or activities which present a greater risk to personnel, equipment
or property than normal operations.
6. Risk Category A - Test or activit ies which present no greater risk than normal operations.
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Echo Range

True Heading
060°

Figure 6-6
Forward Looking Analysis Testing Terrain Feature
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and wingtip ARDS pods. The first was a level approach to the mountain using a 1,000 ft buffer
as depicted in Figure 6-7. (The peak was at 5,600 ft MSL)
Second was a diving approach to the mountain shown in Figure 6-8. This was also performed
with the RADALT both on and off. The points marked “B” and “C” were the terminate run
altitude and planned bottom out altitude respectively.
The third scenario was a climbing approach to the terrain feature. This was conducted only
with the aircraft RADALT on and is shown in Figure 6-9.

CFIT Protection
The next phase of testing was the CFIT protection evaluation of the system, and was the most
dynamic. This involved maneuvering the aircraft toward terrain at varying rates to determine the
accuracy of the warnings and terrain clearance during the recovery. This was done with a variety
of safety buffer altitudes over level and mountainous terrain with the aircraft configured in one of
three ways. A baseline configuration named, “Fighter Escort – Clean” (FE/CL) and a high gross

Projected TAWS
Recovery
Heading 060°
500 ft

6100 ft MSL
400 KCAS
1000 ft
Buffer

5600 ft
MSL

2500 ft MSL

Figure 6-7
Level Approach Forward Looking Analysis
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Recovery
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B
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6820 ft
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1000 ft
Buffer

5600 ft
MSL

2500 ft MSL

Figure 6-8
Diving Approach Forward Looking Analysis

Projected TAWS
Recovery

B
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AOD As
Required
5600 ft
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450Knots, Heading 060°
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A

2500 ft MSL

Figure 6-9
Climbing Approach Forward Looking Analysis
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weight configuration called the “interdiction” (INT) load were used for most tests to verify the
edges of the system performance envelope. In addition, an asymmetric load (“ASYM”) was
defined to verify the algorithm’s accuracy when the aircraft’s roll rate and roll limiter were
invoked due to an asymmetric configuration. The CR or “Cruise Configuration”, which consisted
of gear up and flaps in “auto”, was used for most testing, although the “Power Approach” (PA)
Configuration of gear down with flaps fully extended was used to test landing pattern scenarios.
The F/A-18E/F aircraft external stores stations are depicted in Figure 6-10, and the external stores
loads are presented in Table 6-6.
CFIT protection flights utilized a “Test Pilot” in the front cockpit, and a “Safety Pilot” at the
controls in the back cockpit. To thoroughly evaluate the entire system, the effects of a disoriented
pilot needed to be included in the recovery. To do this, each run began with the Safety Pilot
maneuvering the aircraft into the point, while the Test Pilot turned his head, closed his eyes and
performed some mental task during the setup to induce a loss of situational awareness. When the
TAWS aural warning occurred, the Test Pilot reacted to the warning and recovered the aircraft as
if his life depended on it. The entire Test Pilot response and recovery, including the initial
reaction, g-onset rate, roll rate and intuitive nature of the recovery cues (i.e. did the Test Pilot
follow the arrow for the recovery while trying to regain SA?), was evaluated. In the instances

11

10 9

8 7

6

5 4

3 2

Figure 6-10
F/A-18E/F External Stores Stations
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1

Table 6-6
F/A-18E/F TEST LOADINGS
Loading

Station Station

Station

Station

Station

Station

Station

Station

Station

Station

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1

FE-CL

ARDS
POD

CATM-120 TANK

CATM-120

ARDS
POD

MK84
MK84 CATM-120 TANK
LDCFA LDCFA

CATM-120

ARDS
POD

MK84
LDCFA

(53,495 lbs)
INT
(61,500 lbs)
ASYM
22K ft-lbs
RWH

2

Station

(Weight)

ARDS
POD
MK84
MK84
LDCFA LDCFA

TANK

ARDS
POD
ARDS
POD

(54,787 lbs)

where a “crash” occurred, and the aircraft flew below the buffer altitude, the data were used to restimulate the simulator to understand where algorithm adjustments were required.
The Safety Pilot was prepared to take control of the aircraft if the Test Pilot reacted incorrectly
to the warning cues, or initiated a recovery at the terminate run altitude if no warning was
generated.
In addition, practice runs with the Test Pilot’s eyes open were conducted for the most
aggressive runs in order to mitigate risk. This allowed the aircrew to become familiar with the gonset required to avoid aircraft overstress during testing.
CFIT Protection Over Level Terrain
CFIT flights over level terrain were conducted with both FE/CL and INT loadings with test
conditions ranging from 150 KCAS to transonic (0.92 IMN) airspeeds, aircraft attitudes of level
to 120° AOB, and dive angles between level and 45° at the warning point. Each loading required
a different test setup in terms of safety buffer altitudes because of the changes to aircraft
performance caused by the differences in gross weight and drag. A summary of the test points
and their safety buffer altitudes are shown in Tables 6-7 and 6-8.
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CFIT Protection Over Mountains
Testing over varied terrain provided some additional challenges to the test team because of the
assumptions that needed to be made to implement the safety buffers. The safety buffers and
subsequent altitude calculations for terminate run altitude and expected warnings relied on
knowing the actual ground level below the aircraft. Over mountainous terrain the worst case
(highest local terrain feature) had to be assumed for safety. Therefore, if the aircraft was not over
this terrain feature during the setup, warnings would not be triggered at the expected altitudes,
and the terminate run altitude would be penetrated causing a knock it off call by the safety
observer. To mitigate this, the buffer altitudes had to be moved up to allow some “slop” to
account for this while still providing the required worst case safety independent of terrain.
Due to the varied terrain, it was also determined that these tests should be performed with the
Test Pilot’s eyes open using only the FE/CL stores configuration. Actual performance of the
entire system was extrapolated using the pilot response information gathered while testing over
level terrain. Likewise, aircraft performance at the heavy gross weight configuration was verified
sufficiently over level terrain. Figure 6-11 shows the actual terrain used for testing, with the
highest terrain elevation noted. Table 6-9 shows the list of test points and their associated buffer
altitudes.
Asymmetric Dive Recoveries
A subset of the CFIT dive recoveries was tested with the ASYM external stores configuration,
which resulted in asymmetry near the aircraft limit. The test was conducted over level terrain
with the Test Pilot’s eyes open. Risk mitigations included build-up consisting of practice runs at
stepped up altitudes and before the PA configuration test as well as the safety observers and
displays located in the control room. Table 6-10 depicts the buffer and planned event altitudes
for each test point.
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Dive Angle
(deg)

AOB ± 5
(deg)

Warning Altitude 1
(ft MSL)

Flight Test Safety
Buffer Altitude
(ft)

Planned Bottom-out
Altitude
(ft AGL)

Terminate Run
Altitude
(ft MSL)

CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
PA
PA
PA

Airspeed ± 20
(KCAS)

F5.P1
F5.P2
F5.1
F5.2
F5.3
F5.4
F5.5
F5.6
F5.7
F5.8
F5.9
F5.10
F5.11
F5.12
F5.13
F5.14
F5.P33
F5.153
F5.163

Config

Run

Table 6-7
CFIT Over Level Terrain Events – FE/CL Loading

250
550
550
450
450
550
250
350
450
250
250
350
450
450
450
250
1502
210
1502

5±2
25 ± 2
40 ± 4
30 ± 5
35 ± 3
25 ± 2
30 ± 5
30 ± 3
20 ± 2
20 ± 2
20 ± 4
10 ± 3
10 ± 3
5±2
5±2
5±2
15 ± 2
5±2
15 ± 2

0
0
40L
120L
30L
0
120L
20R
0
30R
80R
60L
80R
0
30R
0
0
30R
0

7586
9118
11322
8884
8265
7718
6983
6616
6312
5465
5912
4441
4501
4191
4163
4086
4498
4101
4498

5100
5100
5100
3700
3700
3700
3000
3000
3000
2500
2500
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600

5150
5150
5150
3750
3750
3750
3050
3050
3050
2550
2550
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650

2982
6258
9786
7862
7161
6258
6230
5858
5450
5110
5577
3989
4110
3147
3182
2982
4029
3024
4029

Notes: 1. Calculated for a 53,500 lb aircraft and the lesser of 5 G or 80% of available G
recovery.
2. Airspeed not less than on-speed AOA.
3. 2G and maximum landing weight (50,600 lb)
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Dive Angle
(deg)

AOB ± 5
(deg)

Warning Altitude 1
(ft MSL)

Flight Test Safety
Buffer Altitude
(ft)

Planned Bottom-out
Altitude
(ft AGL)

Terminate Run
Altitude
(ft MSL)

CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
PA
PA
PA

Airspeed ± 20
(KCAS)

F6.P1
F6.P2
F6.1
F6.2
F6.3
F6.4
F6.5
F6.6
F6.7
F6.8
F6.9
F6.10
F6.11
F6.12
F6.13
F6.14
F6.P23
F6.153
F6.163

Config

Run

Table 6-8
CFIT Over Level Terrain Events – INT Loading

250
550
550
450
450
550
250
350
450
250
250
350
450
450
450
250
1502
210
1502

5±2
25 ± 2
40 ± 4
30 ± 5
35 ± 3
25 ± 2
30 ± 5
30 ± 3
20 ± 2
20 ± 2
20 ± 4
10 ± 3
10 ± 3
5±2
5±2
5±2
15 ± 2
5±2
15 ± 2

0
0
40L
120L
30L
0
120L
20R
0
30R
80R
60L
80R
0
30R
0
0
30R
0

7588
9198
11521
9279
8679
8098
7088
6669
6347
6012
6480
4447
4505
4194
4165
4088
4498
4110
4498

5100
5100
5100
4000
4000
4000
3000
3000
3000
3000
3000
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600

5150
5150
5150
4050
4050
4050
3050
3050
3050
3050
3050
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650

2992
6357
10022
7992
7293
6357
6342
5929
5497
5157
5650
4001
4118
3155
3187
2992
4095
3031
4095

Notes: 1. Calculated for a 61,000 lb aircraft and the lesser of 5 G or 80% of available G
recovery.
2. Airspeed not less than on-speed AOA.
3. 2G and maximum landing weight (50,600 lb)
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Figure 6-11
CFIT Over Mountainous Terrain Test Area
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Note: 1.
recovery.
2.
3.
4.

Dive Angle
(deg)

AOB ± 5
(deg)

Warning Altitude 1, 4
(ft MSL)

Flight Test Safety
Buffer Altitude 4
(ft)

Planned Bottom-out
Altitude 4
(ft AGL)

Terminate Run
Altitude 4
(ft MSL)

CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
PA
PA
PA

Airspeed ± 20
(KCAS)

F4.P1
F4.P2
F4.1
F4.2
F4.3
F4.4
F4.5
F4.6
F4.7
F4.8
F4.9
F4.10
F4.11
F4.12
F4.13
F4.14
F4.P33
F4.153
F4.163

Config

Run

Table 6-9
CFIT Over Mountainous Terrain Test Points

250
550
550
450
450
450
550
350
250
450
250
350
550
550
250
250
1502
190
1502

20 ± 2
40 ± 4
40 ± 4
35 ± 3
20 ± 2
30 ± 4
20 ± 3
30 ± 4
20 ± 2
10 ± 4
10 ± 4
10 ± 2
10 ± 2
10 ± 2
10 ± 4
5±2
15 ± 2
5±2
15 ± 2

0
0
0
0
30L
80R
50L
60R
0
120L
120R
20L
0
40L
80R
30R
30R
0
30R

11040
14023
14023
10987
9938
11290
10560
10350
9440
7910
7648
7335
7507
7695
7612
7149
7515
7145
7515

5100
5100
5100
3500
3500
3500
3500
3500
3500
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600
1600

5150
5150
5150
3550
3550
3550
3550
3550
3550
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650
1650

7968
12392
12392
9836
8767
10325
9463
9205
7968
7643
7182
6787
7005
7263
7149
6085
7172
6039
7172

Calculated for a 53,500 lb aircraft and the lesser of 5 G or 80% of available G
Airspeed not less than on-speed AOA.
2G and maximum landing weight (50,600 lb)
All altitudes based on highest local terrain elevation of 5348 feet MSL.
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Nuisance Warning testing
The final phase of testing was nuisance warning evaluation. The system design made tradeoffs in performance to reduce nuisance warnings as much as possible because of prior experience
with GPWS, which initially was prone to nuisance warnings. To verify this, a series of tests were
flown to probe the edges of the aircraft operating envelope. No buffer altitudes or other
limitations were imposed on the aircraft for these flights.
Low-Level Performance
Two nuisance warning low-level routes were developed and flown to ensure that tactically
representative maneuvers made during low-level flight would not result in warnings. These
routes included mountainous terrain, ridgeline crossings, canyons and flight over water. They
were flown with both the FE/CL and INT loads, first at 500 ft and then at 200 ft. Safety
mitigations included buildup, and a chase aircraft for the 200 ft evaluation. The routes were
flown at 450 – 540 KCAS. Figure 6-12 details one of the two routes within the R2508 restricted
area.
Low Altitude Tactics
Another potential source of nuisance warnings was the standard maneuvers and dive angle
rules that make up Low Altitude Tactics (LAT). These are Three Dimensional (3D) evasive
maneuvers that are flown to within 200 ft of the ground in strict accordance with a set of rules
that detail dive angle and altitude. The test team used the safety displays detailed earlier and a
safety observer in the control room to provide a knock-it-off call if required. These standard
maneuvers were flown with a LAT qualified Test Pilot and LAT instructor Safety Pilot in the
back seat. All points were flown first in the simulator, and several proficiency flights were flown
to gain LAT currency prior to the flight tests. LAT dive rule recovery points are shown in Table
6-11.
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Run

Config

Airspeed ± 20
(KCAS)

Dive Angle
(deg)

AOB ± 5
(deg)

Warning
Altitude
(ft AGL)

Flight Test
Safety Buffer
Altitude
(ft)

Planned
Bottom-out
Altitude
(ft AGL)

Terminate Run
Altitude
(ft AGL)

Table 6-10
Asymmetric Dive Recovery Test Points

S14.P1.1
S14.1.1
S14.1.2
S14.1.3
S14.1.4
S14.1.5
S14.1.6
S14.P1.7
S14.1.7

CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
CR
PA
PA

550
550
450
250
450
250
350
210
210

40 ± 4
40 ± 4
30 ± 5
30 ± 5
20 ± 2
20 ± 2
10 ± 3
5±2
5±2

40L
40L
120L
120L
0
30R
60L
30R
30R

9764
8764
6196
4679
3819
3620
1979
1631
931

6200
5200
3600
2900
2900
2900
1400
1400
700

6250
5250
3650
2950
2950
2950
1450
1450
750

7300
7300
5200
4000
3100
2900
1700
800
800

Notes: 1. Calculated for a 61,000 lb aircraft and the lesser of 5 G or 80% of available G recovery.
2. Airspeed not less than on-speed AOA.
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Figure 6-12
TAWS Low-Level Nuisance Route
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The 3D LAT maneuvers consisted of the Straight-ahead Oblique Jink (SOJ), Vertical Jink,
Reverse Oblique Jink (ROJ), and Turning Oblique Jink (TOJ), as listed in Table 6-12, which
details the test points and bottom-out altitudes.
Weapons Delivery Recovery Testing
Some weapons delivery profiles at the edges of the aircraft performance envelope were also
flown to check for possible nuisance warnings. While no weapons were released, these were
performed with the heavy INT loadout and were conducted on the range with the test team safety
observers and displays. All points were flown in the simulator first, and buildup was applied by
flying the fastest point at each dive angle at stepped up altitudes prior to lowering the profile to
the minimum altitude. The altitude lost during these “warmup” delivery profiles was compared
with the predictions before moving down. The “Z-Diagrams” detailing the dive delivery
parameters are presented as Figure 6-13. Recovery was initiated at the release altitude or the
aircraft “Break-X” (a HUD bombing mode symbol which indicates the weapon has insufficient

Table 6-11
LAT Dive Rule Recovery Test Points

Run

KCAS

F12.2.1
F12.2.2
F12.2.3
F12.2.4
F12.2.5
F12.2.6
F12.2.7
F12.2.8
F12.2.9

420
480
520
420
480
520
420
480
520

Dive
10
10
10
25
25
25
20
20
20

Dive Recovery
AOB
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Altitude
500
500
500
1500
1500
1500
1000
1000
1000

Bottom-out
Altitude
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200

Table 6-12
3D LAT maneuvers

Run

Maneuver

F12.3.1
F12.3.2
F12.3.3
F12.3.4
F12.3.5
F12.3.6
F12.3.7
F12.3.8

SOJ
Vert Jink
ROJ
TOJ
SOJ
Vert Jink
ROJ
TOJ

Dive Recovery
Climb Angle
(deg.)
20
20
20
20
25
25
25
25

Delay (sec)

Bottom-out
Altitude

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200

time to properly arm) whichever comes first. No buffer altitudes were used.
Off-Nominal Approaches
The final nuisance warning check was during simulated off-nominal carrier landing
approaches. While a primary designed use for the system includes providing protection around
the carrier landing pattern, there was some concern that warnings might be given in off-nominal,
but not CFIT imminent conditions. Therefore several series of approaches was designed which
included final corrections near the touchdown point to see whether warnings would be triggered.
These tests were run under the control of a Landing Signal Officer (LSO) just as they would be
during a carrier landing, but were performed at China Lake rather than at an actual aircraft carrier.
The LSO acted as the safety observer, ready to call a wave-off if adverse trends were noted
during testing. Tables 6-13 and 6-14 summarize the approach and landing points tested.
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F12.1.3

Practice 1
9000 ft, 450 KCAS

31°

30°
580 KCAS
0.95M
600 KTAS
Initiate Recovery

8000 ft, 400 KCAS

27°

30°

530 KCAS

550 – 590 kts

3432 ft

Initiate Recovery

Bottom Out 1500 ft

F12.1.4

8000 ft, 350 KCAS

8000 ft, 450 KCAS

27°
30°

Initiate Recovery

2174 ft

Bottom Out 500 ft

F12.1.2

470 KCAS
480 KTAS

500 – 540 kts

2200 ft

Break X

2600 ft

Break X

31°

30°
580 KCAS
0.95M
600 KTAS

440 – 480 kts

550 – 590 kts

1908 ft
2600 ft

Break X
Break X

27°

1840 ft

Initiate Recovery

Bottom Out 500 ft

2432 ft

Bottom Out 500 ft

Figure 6-13
Weapons Delivery Nuisance Warning Test Dive Profiles
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31°

Table 6-13
Off-Nominal Approach and Landing Scenarios
Approach #

Pass

F13.2.1

VFR approach,400 KCAS 1000 foot break at
numbers, tight pattern, flared, Touch-and-Go

F13.2.2

VFR approach, simulate IFR approach, break out at
200 feet, high on centerline over end of runway, flare,
Touch-and-Go, repeat as required.

F13.2.3

VFR approach, 400 KCAS 1500 foot break at
numbers, tight pattern, flare, Touch-and-Go.

F13.2.4

VFR approach, simulate IFR approach, break out at
200 feet, high over end of runway and 200 feet right
of centerline, descend to runway and flare, Touch-andGo, Repeat as required.

Table 6-14
Off –Nominal Carrier Landing Scenarios
Approach #

Pass

LSO notes

Nominal pass.

OK

F13.1.1

1 ball high start, correct to on glideslope by in the
middle position

HX HCDIM

F13.1.2

2 ball high start, correct to on glideslope by in the
middle position

HX HCDIM

F13.1.3

1 ball high from start to in the middle, correct to on
glideslope by in close position

HX-IM HCDIC

F13.1.4

High overshooting start, 2 ball high overshooting
start, correcting to on glideslope and on line up by in
the middle

HOSX CD•LUIM
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Flight testing terrain warning systems intended for use on high performance aircraft presents
many unique challenges due to the required operating envelope and basic assumptions made in
their design. There is usually very little margin allowed for recovery once a warning is issued,
and testing such systems thoroughly and safely can be extraordinarily difficult.
As discussed in the previous section, some particular techniques can be employed to both safely
and thoroughly test such systems.
First, some means of elevating the testing away from the true terrain must be used if the
system is designed to provide last second warnings that would be too hazardous to test without
sensible terrain clearance factors. The use of a designed-in capability for “tricking” the system
into adding a safety buffer to calculated results while still using aircraft sensor inputs should be
considered.
The use of simulation to extend test results can provide a means of affordably testing a system
safely throughout an aircraft’s operating envelope. Though the cost of developing and validating
the models using carefully constructed flight tests can be expensive, it is cost effective when
considering the cost of repeated flights in a fly-fix-fly scenario which is often required to
optimize protection algorithms and minimize nuisance warnings. In addition, simulation
scenarios that are unsafe to fly can be run to test system operation to the extreme edges of the
aircraft operating envelope. It is recommended that simulation models be developed and
validated for use in testing terrain avoidance systems.
Since terrain warning systems rely on aircraft sensors to provide inputs, considerable risk is
generated by using those sensor to provide safety information during flight test. A single sensor
malfunction could result in failure to initiate a timely recovery. In addition, test pilot task
saturation or fixation can also result in failure to recover from test maneuvers near terrain. These
risks can be mitigated by instrumenting test aircraft with redundant sensors, as well as telemetry
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systems to relay appropriate data to dedicated safety monitors that can focus solely on issuing
backup recovery initiation calls if required.
In addition, thorough testing of terrain avoidance systems intended for high-performance
aircraft would require an inordinate number of flights to cover all of the possible permutations of
aircraft configuration, external stores asymmetry and maneuver envelopes possible for modern
multi-mission aircraft. A worst-case set of configurations should be defined to maintain
confidence that the system will work as expected throughout its intended operating envelope.
Also, the nature of terrain avoidance system testing, where most events need to occur in
proximity to terrain, introduces some unusual risks into a planned test program. Close attention
to detail and a very rigorous safety review process must be utilized to ensure that nothing is
overlooked, and that the planned events are safe.
Table 7-1 summarizes the recommendations for conducting safe and effective flight tests of
terrain avoidance systems intended for use on high performance aircraft.

Table 7-1
Summary of Recommendations
1
2

3

4

5

Recommendation
Design a system safety buffer to move testing away from terrain
Simulation models must be validated and used to verify proper warning generation at
the edges of the protection envelope and to optimize CFIT protection versus nuisance
warnings.
Instrument the test aircraft with telemetry for use in providing dedicated safety
displays on the ground for backup recovery calls.
Worst case gross weight, asymmetry and operational scenarios should be developed to
spot check system operation throughout the aircraft operating envelope for all mission
areas.
A rigorous safety review process should be utilized to ensure safety when developing
test scenarios
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APPENDIX A
Table A-1
F/A-18 TAWS Configurable Parameters
Array
OffSet Parameter Name

Description
Determines which aircraft TAWS is in
Threshold for when "close enough" to
Ending_Roll
Targeted bottom-out altitude

F-18CD
value

F-18EF
value

2

1

30

30

50

50

5

5

30000

40000

24.8

26.4

0

Aircraft_Type

1

Bank_Threshold

2

Cruise_Clearance_Altitude

3

Data_Invalid_Threshold

4

Default_Weight

5

Gear_Structural_Limit

Maximum number of invalid DTED points
Fail safe gross weight value - used when
weight is available
Landing gear sink rate structural limit

6

Landing_Altitude_Threshold

Maximum altitude for landing profile

500

500

7

Landing_Clearance_Altitude

10

10

8

Maximum_G

5

5

9

PA_Lift_Coefficient

Targeted altitude for structural gear limit
Maximum value for target normal
acceleration
Lift coefficient for landing profile

1.5

1.55

10

Pilot_Delay_Time

Basic pilot reaction time

11

Reference_Weight

Reference weight for G-limiter

12

Roll_Mode_Constant

Roll mode time constant

13

UA_Lift_Coefficient

Lift coefficient for cruise profile

1.7078

1.8

14

Wing_Area

Wing area for lift computation

400

500

15

Dyn_Press_Threshold

Threshold for switching between PA & UA

202

195

16

Landing_Airspeed_Threshold

Maximum airspeed for landing profile

200

200

17

Close_to_ground

10

10

18

DTED_Bad_K

299

299

19

DTED_Bad_value

-32767

-32767

20

First_DTED_Error

Minimum value for believable DTED_HAT
Value for DTED_Error when DTED is
invalid
Value for terrain height when DTED is
invalid
Initial value for DTED Error

10

10

21

First_Sigma_P

Initial value for Sigma P

5

5

22

First_terrain_variation

5

5

23

I_am_lost

500

500

24

I_am_REALLY_lost

5000

5000

25

Lowest_Max_DTED_Error

120

120

26

Max_under_ground

50

50

27

MSL_Error_Divisor

20

20

28

Sigma_Mult_for_Max_Error

4

4

29

Terrain_Exponent

0.25

0.25

30

Terrain_Multiplier

Initial value for terrain variations
Maximum value to believe current aircraft
position
Maximum value to believe aircraft position
when over the ocean
Minimum value for Max_DTED_Error
Value used when checking if the aircraft is
below the DTED terrain
MSL Error divisor for calculating DTED
error
How many standard deviations is Maximum
error?
Exponent for terrain height used to
determine DTED error
Factor for multiplying terrain variation to
determine DTED error

2

2
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1

1

32357

42097

0.5

0.5

Table A-1 (Continued)
F/A-18 TAWS Configurable Parameters
Array
OffSet Parameter Name

Description

F-18CD
value

F-18EF
value

0.25

0.25

15000

15000

99999

99999

3

3

2

2

0.998

0.998

200000

200000

1.0

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.90

0.90

5000

5000

4

4

11

11

800

800

0.042

0.042

50

50

80

80

determine DTED error
31

Terrain_Quality_Index

32

Terrain_Variation_K

33

Max_Error_K

34

Accuracy_Exponent

35

Diff_BW_Neighbor_divisor

36

Long_Bias_decay

37

Long_Bias_divisor

38

Nuisance_K

39

Rad_Error_K

40

Short_Bias_decay

41

Short_Bias_divisor

42

S_b_divisor

43

Inhibit_Timer_Threshold

44

Baro_Bias

45

Baro_Error_Multiplier

46

First_MSL_Error_Est

Conversion of terrian variation to equivalent
of sigma_P
Decay divisor for calculating terrain
variation
Value for Maximum DTED Error when
DTED is invalid
Weighting for 1 frame of Rad_Alt data
Proportion of Diff_BW_Neighbor to add to
Final_HAT
Constant to determine speed of decay for
Long_Bias
Constant to determine how much 1 frame
contributes to the Long_Bias
Weighting of buffer "noise" to add to
Final_HAT
Constant to determine part of
Rad_Alt_Error used for noise buffer
Constant to determine speed of decay for
Short_Bias
Constant to determine how much 1 frame
contributes to the Short_Bias
Proportion of Short_Bias used to derive
noise in Final_HAT
Threshold value for inhibit timer to indicate
timeout
F/A-18 bias put into INS Baro in some
transonic conditions
Estimated error in BARO altitude based on
spec
Initial value for MSL Altitude error

47

GPS_Alt_Error_Max

Altitude error limit for using GPS data

48

GPS_Pos_Error_Max

Position error limit for using GPS data

80

80

49

Lower_transonic

0.95

0.95

50

Position_Drift_Timer

500

500

51

Upper_transonic

1.05

1.05

52

Aural_Persistence_Timer_Threshold

4

4

53

Gear_Repetition_Time

80

80

54

Latch_Timer_Bank_Threshold

45

45

55

Latch_Timer_Threshold

20

20

56

Left_Bank_Threshold

150

150

57

PA_Power_Threshold

Beginning of transonic mach region
Time of how long after loss of GPS we lose
position fix
End of transonic mach region
Threshold value for aural persistence timer
to indicate timeout
Repetition t ime for "Check Gear" when gear
handle is down
Bank threshold value for latch timer
Threshold value for latch timer to indicate
timeout
Threshold to determine left/right roll
command
Criteria for using "Power" during landings

8.5

8.5

58

Throttle_Threshold

Threshold to determine when at full power

100

46.5

59

UA_Power_Threshold

18

18

60

Enough_bad_hits

Criteria for using "Power" during cruise
Number of bad data points needed to disable
Over_Ocean

500

500

74

Table A-1 (Continued)
F/A-18 TAWS Configurable Parameters
Array
OffSet Parameter Name
61

Exponent_for_Rad_Alt_angle

62

Need_consecutive_hits

63

Ocean_Check_MSL_Multiplier

64

Proportion_of_sigma_P

65

Rad_Alt_multiplier

66

Starting_Rad_Alt_K

67

Minimum_good_Rad_Alt_HAT

68

First_Pos_Error

69

Points_to_Use

70

Under_the_Earth

71

Coast_Altitude_Threshold

72

Envelope_Timer_Threshold

73

Ignore_Radalt_Altitude_Threshold

74

Level_Terrain_Time_Threshold

75

Maximum_Coast_Timer

76

Maximum_Envelope_Timer

77

Maximum_Ignore_Timer

78

Maximum_Radar_Altitude

79

Minimum_Radar_Altitude

80

Over_Ocean_Elevation_Threshold

81

Over_Ocean_Slope_Threshold

82

Slope_Airspeed_Threshold

83

Terrain_Elevation_Timer_Threshold

84

Gear_Altitude_Threshold

85

Takeoff_Timer_Threshold

86

Waveoff_Airspeed_Threshold

87

Waveoff_Altitude_Threshold

88

Waveoff_Sink_Rate_Threshold

89

Waveoff_Timer_Threshold

Description
Increase in error due to platform not level
How many good consecutive rad alt
readings needed for persistency timer
Multiplier for potential error when verifying
no terrain over the ocean
Additional error from terrain roughness
ahead
Proportional radar altimeter error
Constant radar altimeter error
Minimum value to believe Rad_Alt with
DTED
Initial value for Position_Error
How far ahead to look in DTED to calculate
Sigma_P
Lower-than-possible value for DTED terrain
height
Altitude below which COAST should
transition to OPERATE
Threshold value for envelope timer to
ignore the radar altimeter
Altitude above which the Radar Altimeter
may be ignored if not locked on the ground
Time threshold of level terrain
Timeout value for the Coast timer
Maximum value for the envelope timer for
ignoring the radar altimeter
Maximum value for the ignore timer for
radar altitude
Maximum radar altitude that can be
believed
Radar altitude which is always ignored
when above the
Ignore_Radalt_Altitude_Threshold
Terrain elevation threshold for non-DTED
over ocean determination
Terrain slope threshold for non-DTED over
ocean determination
Airspeed above which terrain slope can be
computed
Time threshold for erroneous COAST
terrain elevations
Altitude below which gear protection is
provided
Threshold value for takeoff timer to indicate
timeout
Airspeed below which wave-off can be
sensed
Altitude below which wave-off can be
sensed
Sink rate required for wave-off
Threshold value for wave-off timer to
indicate timeout
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F-18CD
value

F-18EF
value

3

3

3

3

2

2

50

50

0.005

0.005

2

2

40

40

100

100

15

15

-1000

-1000

4000

4000

40

40

5000

5000

40

40

1200

1200

110

110

100

100

4950

4950

10

10

100

100

1

1

170

170

41

41

150

150

600

600

200

200

500

500

-16.67

-16.67

50

50

Table A-1 (Continued)
F/A-18 TAWS Configurable Parameters
Array
OffSet Parameter Name

Description

F-18CD
value

F-18EF
value

60

60

2

2

5

5

0.15

0.15

6

6

500

500

10

10

6

6
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Weight_Off_Wheels_Timer_Threshold Threshold value for weight-off-wheels time
to indicate timeout
Threshold which defines level terrain slope
Terrain Slope Level Threshold
for COAST transition
Maximum Gonset rate during normal
Maximum_Gonset
operations
Minimum_Gonset
Minimum Gonset rate
Maximum Gonset Rate in nuisance prone
Maximum_Gonset_Nuisance
areas
Radar altitude which, when below, is
Radar_Altitude_Jump_In_Threshold
ignored
Maximum value for the Radalt Consistency
Maximum_Radalt_Con_Timer
timer
Radalt_Consistency_Threshold
Time threshold for consistent radalt data

98

Maximum_Terrain_Timer

Maximum value for the Calc_terrain_timer

10

10

90
91
92
93
94
95
96

99

Maximum_Roll_Time

Maximum value for Roll_Time

4

4

100

Long_Bias_Multiplier_for_DTED

Long bias effect on DTED_Error

2

2

101

Min_Baro_Error

102

ORT_Bank_Angle_Max

103

ORT_Bank_Cos_Max

104

Avail_Thrust_Con

105

Avail_Thrust_M1

106

Avail_Thrust_M2

107

Avail_Thrust_M3

108

Avail_Thrust_A1

109

Drag_Coeff_Con

110

Drag_Coeff_M1

111

Drag_Coeff_M2

112

Drag_Coeff_M3

113

Drag_Coeff_A1

114

Drag_Coeff_A2

115

Drag_Coeff_A3

116

Drag_Coeff_MA1

117

MinG

118

Roughness_Factor

119

Width_of_T_divisor

Minimum value for barometric altitude error
75
Threshold for bank angle to allow upward
72
lift for ORT
Threshold for cos(bank angle) to allow
0.3
upward lift for ORT
Constant value for available thrust
19177.7
determination
Coefficient for first order mach term in
14745.2
thrust determination
Coefficient for second order mach term in
0
thrust determination
Coefficient for third order mach term in
0
thrust determination
Coefficient for first order angle of attack
0
term in thrust determination
Constant value for drag determination
0.0052623
Coefficient for first order mach term in drag -0.097529
determination
Coefficient for second order mach term in
0.0721954
drag determination
Coefficient for third order mach term in
0
drag determination
Coefficient for first order angle of attack
0.0043428
term in drag determination
Coefficient for second order angle of attack -0.001068
term in drag determination
Coefficient for third order angle of attack
0
term in drag determination
Coefficient for first order mach times angle
-0.013219
of attack term in drag determination
Minimum G for target normal acceleration
1.2
Weighting of terrain roughness in
-0.4
determination of MSL altitude for
trajectories
Divisor for determining "T" intersection of
8
VRT

76

75
72
0.3
32012.41
-26821.5
62407.06
-27683.1
2.346588
0.0040243
-0.292672
0.5913677
-0.240227
-0.007449
0.0025667
0.000035
0.0017992
1.2
-0.4
8

Table A-1 (Continued)
F/A-18 TAWS Configurable Parameters
Array
OffSet Parameter Name

Description

F-18CD
value

F-18EF
value

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.7

0

15000

0.95

0.941

0.91

0.905

1.04

1.045

xxx1

xxx1

30

30

400

400

525

525

1.3

1.3

5

5

25

25

VRT
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Reduction in G-limiter value due to
transonic flight at high altitudes
Reduction in G-limiter value due to
Low_Altitude_G_Bucket_Delta
transonic flight at low altitudes
Altitude at which the high/low altitude GG_Bucket_Altitude_Threshold
bucket delta changes
M inimum mach number at which the GG_Bucket_Minimum_Mach_NoStores bucket can be engaged with STORES flag
not set
Minimum mach number at which the GG_Bucket_Minimum_Mach__Stores
bucket can be engaged with STORES set
Maximum mach number at which the GG_Bucket_Maximum_Mach
bucket can be engaged
Minimum airspeed required to produce the
Corner_Speed
maximum G
Maximum bank angle for which this
Maximum_Bank_Angle
reduction in pilot response time applies
Minimum airspeed for which this reduction
Minimum_Airspeed
in pilot response time applies
Maximum airspeed for which this reduction
Maximum_Airspeed
in pilot response time applies
Reduced pilot response time for nuisance
Reduced_Pilot_Delay
prevention
Minimum dive angle for which this
Minimum_Dive_Angle
reduction in pilot response time applies
Maximum dive angle for which this
Maximum_Dive_Angle
reduction pilot response time applies
High_Altitude_G_Bucket_Delta

Note 1: Actual number omitted due to security classification.
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Table A-2
F/A-18 TAWS Sensor Hierarchy and Effect
Terrain
Definition Mode
System Mode

Attitude and
Acceleration

Position
Source

Velocity
Source

OPERATE

DTED

INS

Aided INS,
GPS1

Aided INS,
GPS, INS1

OPERATE

FLAT EARTH

INS

INS

Aided INS,
GPS, INS

OPERATE

FLAT EARTH

INS

Aided INS,
GPS

Aided INS,
GPS, INS

OPERATE or
COAST 3

FLAT EARTH

INS

Aided INS,
GPS, INS

Aided INS,
GPS, INS

BYPASS

N/A

NONE

Aided INS,
GPS, INS

Aided INS,
GPS, INS

BYPASS

N/A

INS

Aided INS,
GPS, INS

NONE

MSL Altitude 2
GPS, INS
BARO, ADC
BARO
GPS, INS
BARO, ADC
BARO
GPS, INS
BARO, ADC
BARO
GPS, INS
BARO, ADC
BARO
GPS, INS
BARO, ADC
BARO
GPS, INS
BARO, ADC
BARO

DTED

RADALT

Good

Good or
Bad

Good

Good

Bad

Good

Bad

Bad

Good or
bad

Good or
Bad

Good or
bad

Good or
Bad

Notes:
1
The first priority used for position is the Aided INS mode, where GPS position is used to update the INS regularly.
Falling back to solely GPS-only degrades performance slightly, and has no effect on System Mode. The same logic
prevails for velocities.
2

The MSL altitude is set with the following priority (highest to lowest): GPS; INS BARO; ADC BARO. Differences
in MSL altitude source have no effect on System Mode.
3

The TAWS can go to the COAST mode only when the terrain has been determined to be level and the TAWS is in the
FLAT EARTH mode.
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APPENDIX B
Table B-1
F/A-18 TAWS Developmental Test Plan Test Hazard Analysis
HAZARDOUS
CONDITION
Controlled Flight Into
Terrain (CFIT) during
Nuisance Cue Testing

CAUSE
Loss of situational
awareness in close
proximity to terrain.

EFFECT
Loss of
aircraft/aircrew.

RISK ASSESSMENT
Low risk given proper aircrew
experience/practice, test
briefing, and execution.
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PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE
−

Required weather: day VMC with defined horizon and
visual contact with terrain.
−
All maneuvers are operationally representative; no
special maneuvers are required nor desired. Pilot’s
focus will be on flying the maneuver; any nuisance
warnings will be automatically recorded on
instrumentation. Any pilot comments or observations
will be recorded verbally following aircraft recovery
and between maneuvers.
−
Provide sufficient proficiency through simulators
and/or warm-up flights.
Low Level Navigation
−
Chase aircraft required on 200 ft low levels (Chase
min altitude 500 ft).
−
Pilot must fly 500 ft low level build up prior to 200 ft
−
Both 500 ft and 200 ft low level will be flown over the
same route.
−
Back seat safety aircrew required.
Weapons
−
Standard weapons dive delivery profiles in accordance
with the TACMAN, reference 7.
−
Practice weapons dive delivery profiles will be flown
initially 1000 ft above the lowest test point altitude.
−
Recoveries at the stepped up altitude will be
monitored to verify the actual altitude lost during
recovery does not exceed predicted altitude loss.
−
Flight parameters are monitored real-time by a safety
monitor and call for recovery if safety parameters are
exceeded.
−
Radar altimeter set at minimum release/initiate
recovery altitudes. Warning bug checked prior to
maneuvers.
−
G warm-up maneuvers.
−
Back seat safety pilot required.

HAZARD
LEVEL
I/D
CAT B

Table B-1 (Continued)
F/A-18 TAWS Developmental Test Plan Test Hazard Analysis
HAZARDOUS
CONDITION
Controlled Flight Into
Terrain during LAT
flights

CAUSE
Reduced roll
performance in INT
loading

EFFECT
Loss of
aircraft/aircrew.

RISK ASSESSMENT
Low risk given proper aircrew
experience/practice, test
briefing, and execution.
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PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE
LAT

−
−
−
−
−
−
−

Thorough LAT brief conducted prior to flight.
LAT dive rules reviewed prior to each maneuver.
Back seat LAT instructor safety pilot required.
Prerequisite 500 ft low level.
Ground monitoring of critical flight parameters.
LAT flown to comfort level, but no lower than 200 ft.
LAT pre-flown in simulator at flight test conditions
and weights.

HAZARD
LEVEL

Table B-1 (Continued)
F/A-18 TAWS Developmental Test Plan Test Hazard Analysis

HAZARDOUS
CONDITION
Controlled Flight Into
Terrain (CFIT) during
CFIT Protection
(Simulated loss of
SA)/ Functional
Testing.

G Induced Loss of
Consciousness
(GLOC) during CFIT
Protection (Simulated
loss of SA/ Functional
Testing).

CAUSE
Loss of situational
awareness, misapplied
recovery controls,
reliance on TAWS
warnings.

High G-onset rates
during a recovery
maneuver.

EFFECT
Loss of
aircraft/aircrew.

Loss of
consciousness
possibly leading
to loss of
aircraft/aircrew.

RISK ASSESSMENT
Low risk given proper aircrew
experience/practice, test
briefing, and execution.

Low risk given extensive
aircrew experience and warmup.

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE
−

Functional tests will be completed prior to simulated
loss of SA tests.
−
G warm up, recoveries targeting g onset rat es,
sustained g and roll rates required for TAWS
recoveries will be practiced through warm up events.
−
Use of safety buffers to raise TAWS warning
altitudes.
−
Recoveries will be practiced at the fastest and slowest
test speeds in configuration CR prior to CR tests and
at the slowest test speed in configuration PA prior to
PA tests.
−
Provide sufficient proficiency through simulator
sessions.
−
Back seat safety pilot required for CFIT protection
testing.
−
Radar altimeter hard-bug and BARO soft -bug set at
terminate run altitude and warning bugs checked prior
to maneuvers.
−
Flight parameters are monitored real-time by a safety
monitor and call for recovery if safety parameters are
exceeded.
−
Weather day VMC with defined horizon and visual
contact with terrain.
−
Brief knock-it-off parameters prior to maneuver entry.
−
Reviewed GPWS AV-8B mishap report OPNAV
3752-1 and applied lessons learned to test procedures.
A G warm-up will be performed prior to t esting (IAW
NSATS/NWTC SOP, reference 8).
Aircraft recoveries will be practiced in the simulator prior to test
flights and during practice maneuver prior to test events.
Safety pilot starts G straining maneuver prior to expected TAWS
warning altitude.

HAZARD
LEVEL
I/D
CFIT
Protection
CAT B
Functional
Tests
CAT A

I/D
CFIT
Protection
CAT B
Functional
Tests
CAT A
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Table B-1 (Continued)
F/A-18 TAWS Developmental Test Plan Test Hazard Analysis
HAZARDOUS
CONDITION
Aircraft overstress.

CAUSE
Overly aggressive dive
recovery.

EFFECT

RISK ASSESSMENT

Down aircraft,
inspection
requirement.

Low risk given proper aircrew
experience/practice, test
briefing, and execution.

Possible damage
to or loss of
aircraft. Possible
injury to or loss
of aircrew.

Potential risk based on frequent
low level operations during
T&E.

Excessive rate of
descent on landings.

Bird-strike.

Operating at altitudes
where birds normally
fly.
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PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE
G warm up, recoveries targeting G-onset rates, sustained G, and
roll rates required for TAWS recoveries will be practiced through
warm up events.
Ground monitoring of critical flight parameters.
LSO monitor landing parameters during off nominal approaches.
Brief maximum landing weights.
RTB if overstress occurs and analyze to determine cause before
proceeding with test.
Visual look-out by aircrew will be maintained at all times.
If bird-strike should occur, aircraft will climb above 10KFT
MSL, conduct a controllability check, and return to base or a
suitable divert.
Chase aircraft on 200 ft low level routes.

HAZARD
LEVEL
III/D
CAT A

III/C
CAT B
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